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CASE COMMENTS

that Ray Stark suffered from either "delusional" insanity or an "insane
impulse" at the time of the fire. The court found no scientific evidence in
the record to indicate Stark possessed either form of insanity. Dr. Nagulendran's testimony indicated merely that Stark's severe depression caused him
to be incapable of forming criminal intent. The doctor concluded that Stark
did not know right from wrong and was not able to conform his behavior
to the requirements of the law. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that
the question of whether Ray Stark's mental capacity, even assuming a
suicidal purpose, negated Erie's "intentional act" policy provision presented
a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the lower court.
The Starks further argued that if Ray Stark's sole purpose was to
commit suicide, none of the policy clauses would be applicable even if the
court found he possessed the mental capacity to act intentionally because
the intentional act was not directed at the premises. The court found this
argument to be foreclosed as a matter of law because of the Maryland rule
that an insured is charged with intending the consequences of an act that
are substantially certain to result from that act. The Fourth Circuit also
found that the district court correctly dismissed the Stark's conversion and
tortious interference counterclaims.
The Fourth Circuit resolved the unique issue of whether a homeowner's
policy covered a loss caused by the insured's setting fire to his home in an
attempt to commit suicide by applying the law of Maryland concerning the
mental state of suicidal persons. Other circuits appear free to handle similar
situations differently if faced with controlling precedent that has a divergent
view of insanity. Nevertheless, the court's holding is reasonable and fair.
First, the Fourth Circuit's decision allows individuals to recover from
insurance companies when they can offer proof that they were incapable of
entertaining intentionality, but excludes insurers, and consequently premium
payers, from reimbursing an insured for the consequences of the insured's
simple irrationality. Second, the court's requirement that the insured present
evidence of very specific types of insanity makes claiming suicidal purpose
as a disguise for arson very difficult.
J.

FEDERAL COURTS

Guess v. Board of Medical Examiners
967 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1992)
The principle that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to interfere
with a judgment in a state court action in which the state court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties thereto is as old as
our dual state and federal judicial systems. 44' A litigant seeking to remove

441. See Daniels v. Thomas, 225 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1955) (stating that federal court
is without jurisdiction to interfere with judgment of state court action in which state court had
jurisdiction of subject matter and of parties), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
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a state case to federal court faces several established barriers, including
abstention, federal preclusion, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the Eleventh
Amendment. 442 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is another obstacle that
confronts prospective federal plaintiffs. 443 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

interprets 28 U.S.C. section 1257(a) 4" as ordinarily barring direct review
in the lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest state court,
because such authority is vested solely in the Supreme Court. 45
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,46 the United States Supreme Court
advanced the doctrine that lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction
to review the judgments of state courts that have been affirmed by the
highest court of the state. 447 However, nothing in Rooker extended the

scope of this principle beyond issues that were actually decided in state
court and affirmed by the highest court in the state."8 Prior to 1983,
courts applied the Rooker principle fairly narrowly to preclude federal
district court review of state cases involving claims actually decided by the
state court. 449
In 1983, the Supreme Court revived Rooker as a principle of federal
district court jurisdiction in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman.4 0 The Supreme Court held that, while the district court in that
442. See Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter
Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RuTGoms L. REv. 859, 859 (1990) (describing obstacles
litigants face when attempting to remove state case to federal court).
443. See id. (explaining that Rooker-Feldman doctrine is lesser-known obstacle which litigant
must overcome in order to remove state case to federal court).
444. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988). The statute states that:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the
validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the
validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title,
right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or
the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the
United States.
1d.
445. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989) (explaining Rooker-Feldman
doctrine's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §. 1257).
446. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
447. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (stating that when
judgment has been rendered by state trial court and affirmed by state's highest court, only
United States Supreme Court can exercise appellate review).
448. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 863 (arguing that it cannot be assumed, based only
on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., that scope of principle advanced in that case extends beyond
issues actually decided in state court and affirmed by highest state court).
449. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 864 (observing that pre-Feldman application of
Rooker principle among circuits was usually in cases with facts closely analogous to those in
Rooker: issues were actually litigated and decided by state court, and affirmed by highest state
court); see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964)
(stating that party forgoes his right to district court review when he submits federal claims to
state courts, litigates federal claims there, and has them decided there).
450. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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case lacked authority to review a state court's final determination, the
district court did have jurisdiction over "general challenges" to the con-

stitutionality of a statute or rule. 4 1 In laying the groundwork for future
applications of this principle, the Court stipulated two conditions that

lower federal courts have interpreted differently. First, the Court noted
that district courts may not hear the constitutional claims if they are
"inextricably intertwined" with the state court's decision. 45 2 This propo-

sition has been interpreted as extending Rooker to issues that were not
actually decided by the state court, but that were "inextricably inter-

twined" with the merits of the state court judgment. 453 Second, the
Supreme Court in Rooker commented that by falling to raise claims in
state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review in any federal
court. 45 4 While some commentators view this comment as nothing more
than a reference to the limit on the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, 455 others have interpreted this comment to further extend Rooker to

preclude federal district court jurisdiction over any claim that a litigant
could have raised in state court, whether or not the claim either was
actually decided by the state court or was456inextricably intertwined with
the claims that were litigated and decided.

Thus, Feldman left a number of questions to be addressed by the
lower courts, including the proper meaning and scope of "inextricably

intertwined," as well as the "could have raised" question. Since Feldman,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has decided
cases in which the court dismissed the plaintiff's constitutional claims as
impermissible particularized challenges "inextricably intertwined" with the
state court judgment. 4 7 Against this background, the Fourth Circuit again

451. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 488 (1983).
452. Id. at 483-84 n.16.
453. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 876 (stating that Justice Brennan's analysis in
Feldman clearly extended the Rooker principle, which was previously applied to issues actually
decided by state court, to issues that were not actually decided by state court).
454. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16.
455. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 876 (arguing that Brennan's comment.was reference
to limit on Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, rather than dicta suggesting that Rooker may
extend to issued that could have been raised in state court).
456. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 876 (stating that other commentators have suggested
that Feldman should be read to preclude federal district jurisdiction over any claim that litigant
could have raised in state court, whether or not claim either was actually decided by state court
or was inextricably intertwined with claims that were litigated and decided). Thompson cites to
Robert B. Funkhouser et al., Comment, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the
Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54 FoRAm L. RaE. 767, 781
(1986) and Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine's Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAA L. Ray. 627,
643-47, 655 (1987).
457. See generally Leonard v. Suthard, 927 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that district
court had no jurisdiction to hear state police officer's claim that transfer violated constitutional
rights because claim was inextricably intertwined with state judicial determination that transfer
was not grievable); Czura v. Supreme Court, 813 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that district
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approached these issues in Guess v. Board of Medical Examiners of North
458
Carolina.
In Guess, the plaintiff Dr. George Guess challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute and its application to him by the Board
of Medical Examiners of North Carolina (Board). The Board had previously revoked the medical license of Guess pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
section 90-14(a)(6), which gives the Board power to revoke a physician's
license for unprofessional conduct, including departure from, or failure
to conform to, the standards of the medical profession. The Board had
determined that Guess's prescribing of homeopathic medicine in the course
of his medical practice departed from, and did not conform to, the
standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice in the State of
North Carolina. The Board made this determination on the grounds that
the state had no statutory scheme for the regulation of the practice of
homeopathic medicine.
Guess appealed the Board's decision through the state system to the
United States Supreme Court. The Superior Court of Wake County, North
Carolina, overturned the Board's order, concluding that the Board's
findings of fact were not supported by the evidence and that the decision
was arbitrary and capricious. Upon the Board's appeal, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court, explaining that there was
an implicit requirement in the statute that the nonconforming practices
harm the public in some way. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted
discretionary review and reversed the court of appeals. The North Carolina
Supreme Court further found that the statute was valid and contained no
requirement of injury to the public. The United States Supreme Court
denied Guess's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Guess attempted to enter the federal court system by bringing an
action in thee District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Guess sought an injunction against the Board for violation of his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a declaratory judgment that the
statute under which his license was revoked was unconstitutional. At the
same time, patients of Guess brought a derivative action in the district
court, seeking both an injunction against the Board's revocation of Guess'
medical license and a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional.
With regard to Guess' claims, the district court held that it had no
jurisdiction to hear Guess's claims because to do so would require improper
review of the North Carolina court's decision. The district court found
that Guess's claims were not separate federal constitutional claims that
could be adjudicated, rather they were essentially the same claims and
issues raised in state court. The district court concluded that addressing

court had no jurisdiction to hear bar admission applicant's claim that state's bar admission rule
was applied to him unconstitutionally, because claim was inextricably intertwined with state
judicial determination denying applicant's waiver of rule).
458. 967 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1992).
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these constitutional claims would involve improper review because Guess's
current claims were inextricably intertwined with the state court decision.
With regard to the patients' claims, the district court applied a balancing
test and determined that an injunction could not be granted because the
balance of harm and the public interest favored the Board.
Both Guess and his patients appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The patients argued that the district court
misapplied the balancing test. Guess argued that the North Carolina
Supreme Court failed to address his constitutional claims and, therefore,
he had not received adjudication of those claims. Furthermore, Guess
argued that he asserted two new constitutional claims in his federal
complaint which he did not assert in state court. To resolve the issues
presented by Guess' claims, the Fourth Circuit first considered the constitutional challenges that Guess asserted in state court and then considered
the new challenges.
The court found that Guess's claims that the statute was vague,
deprived him of fundamental rights, and violated equal protection, were
essentially the same constitutional challenges made in state court. Those
state claims included allegations that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, violated equal protection, infringed upon constitutionally protected
privacy rights, and was arbitrary and capricious as applied. As to these
challenges, the court applied Feldman and found that Guess's effort to
have the federal court relitigate claims already made to the state court
was impermissible. The court also rejected Guess's argument that his
constitutional claims were never addressed or adjudicated by the state
court. The court cited Feldman for the proposition that even if a claim is
not presented to a state court,' or by inference is not ruled upon, a plaintiff
is not entitled to bring that claim in federal court if the claim was one
that should have been brought in the state court.
The Fourth Circuit next turned to the two new constitutional claims
of abridgement of free speech rights and violation of the Commerce Clause
by imposition of an impermissible barrier to the purchase and use of
homeopathic drugs. The court held that, although Feldman permits general
constitutional challenges, these new claims were impermissible to the extent
that they challenge the statute's application to Guess. The court explained
that the claims constituted a particularized challenge to the state court's
adjudication, which is clearly prohibited by Feldman.
The court also noted that Feldman does not preclude the application
of res judicata to general constitutional challenges. In this case, res judicata
also precludes assertion of Guess's claims because, according to the court,
there was no reason why Guess could not have raised all of his constitutional claims in the state court.
Next the Fourth Circuit discussed the interpretation of Feldman that
precludes raising claims which could have been raised in the state court.
The court approved of the reasoning of other circuits 45 9 that Feldman only
459. See Guess v. Board of Medical Examiners, 967 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing
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permits a claim to be raised in federal court which (1) the plaintiff had
no opportunity to raise in the state court and (2) was not otherwise
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.
Applying this two-prong test, the court found that, (1) since Guess
had a full and fair opportunity to raise the Commerce Clause and First
Amendment claims in state court, res judicata barred the district court
from hearing those claims, and that, (2) in any case, the new claims were
inextricably intertwined with the state court decision. The court considered
the new claims inextricably intertwined because they were merely "artificial
attempts to redefine the relief sought" and because hearing these claims
would necessarily involve a review of the North Carolina decision against
Guess.
Lastly, the court considered the appeal made by Guess' patients. Since
the patients' claims were derivative of Guess' causes of action, the district
court's lack of jurisdiction to review and hear Guess' case rendered the
patients' derivative claims moot.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district court jurisdiction over any issues that were decided in state court, and also over any
new federal claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the merits of
the state court judgment. However, the distinction set forth by the Supreme
Court in Feldman is difficult to draw, and the "inextricably intertwined"
language by itself does not provide district courts with a bright line rule."4
Consequently, district court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Guess exemplifies one side of the gray
line.
By holding that federal courts may not review issues which were
raised, litigated, and decided in state courts, the Guess court is in accord
with most other circuits. However, the circuits are split regarding whether
federal courts may review issues which were raised in the state court, but
which were not litigated or decided there. Some circuits allow federal
district courts to decide constitutional claims that were raised in the state
court but which the state court failed to consider. 46' Other circuits interpret
Feldman to prohibit federal district court consideration of all issues raised
at the state level, even if the issues were not litigated or decided. 462 The
Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984);
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 902
(1986)).
460. See Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating
that Feldman distinction is difficult to draw and that Feldman language does not provide district
courts with bright line rule), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
461. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (approving federal
district court's consideration of constitutional claims that state court had explicitly refused to
consider). But see Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 865 (9th Cir. 1992) (prohibiting federal
district court consideration of constitutional claim when state court refused to hear complete
argument and refused evidentiary hearing, but stated that it had given plenary consideration to
all claims).
462. See Leaf v. Supreme Court, No. 91-3725, 1992 WL 329010, at *10 (7th Cir. Nov. 12,
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Fourth Circuit in Guess adopted the second approach in its opinion that

Guess was not entitled to bring his constitutional claims in federal court
despite the fact that the North Carolina Supreme Court failed to address

those claims.
With regard to general constitutional challenges which were not raised
in state court, the circuits have followed the Feldman "inextricably intertwined" standard, but the courts have taken different approaches in
interpreting the term "inextricably intertwined." The only guidance offered

by Feldman as to the "inextricably intertwined" inquiry is to look at the
underlying claim and determine if the district court is "in essence" being
called upon to review the state judgment. 463 Some courts have approached
the issue by interpreting the Feldman language fairly narrowly and allowing
jurisdiction over generalized or facial constitutional claims. 464 On the other
side of the line, other courts have dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims,
including claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, as particular challenges
"inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment.4

6s

The Fourth

Circuit in Guess, which characterized Guess' general constitutional claims
as particularized challenges to the state court's adjudication, clearly employed the latter approach.

Because the determination of whether the federal claims are "inextricably intertwined" is made in gray area with no clear definition or
standard, cases with similar circumstances may have very different outcomes. 466 Questions concerning the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

1992) (prohibiting federal district court adjudication of claims raised in state court, which state
court refused to hear, because state court's refusal to hear claims constituted judgment on those
claims).
463. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 n. 16
(1983) (stating that district court was "in essence" being called upon to review state court
decision); Thompson, supra note 431, at 880 (discussing the scope of Feldman's inextricably
intertwined standard and citing Carbonell v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Human Resources,
772 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1985)).
464. See Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992) (interpreting plaintiff's
challenge to statute as general constitutional challenge not so inextricably intertwined with state's
application of statute to plaintiff as to divest federal court of subject matter jurisdiction under
Rooker-Feldman); Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1984)
(interpreting plaintiff's claim as general constitutional attack); Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d
401, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1983) (deciding that general constitutional challenges were not inextricably
intertwined with state's denial of plaintiff's application to state bar despite fact that thrust of
plaintiff's complaint was purely personal, not general constitutional attack); Thompson, supra
note 431, at 880 & n.95 (citing cases with facts similar to Feldman situation where courts did
allow jurisdiction over generalized constitutional challenges).
465. See Czura v. Supreme Court, 813 F.2d 644, 646 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that action,
despite its framing as broad constitutional challenge, was actually particular attack); Thompson,
supra note 431, at 881 & n.98 (citing cases in which courts have dismissed constitutional challenges
as particular challenges inextricably intertwined with state court judgment).
466. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 882 (discussing two cases involving similar complaints
and circumstances that circuit court treated differently in applying "inextricably intertwined"
standard).
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can be decided simply according to the way a court reads a plaintiff's
complaint.

467

Neufeld v. City of Baltimore
964 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1992)

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Burford v. Sun Oil
Co. 468 allows a federal district court to abstain from hearing a case in
order to avoid conflict with a state's administration of its own affairs.
Burford abstention is appropriate when a case presented to a federal
district court contains complex state law issues, or when federal review
469
would disrupt the administration of important state policies.

The Supreme Court refined the criteria for Burford abstention in New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. New Orleans (NOPSI). 470 NOPSI set forth

4 71
the test for Burford abstention which is now used by the Fourth Circuit.

Under NOPSI, Burford abstention is proper when a federal court is faced
with difficult questions of state law and policy, and the questions are
more important than the case before the court. The NOPSI test also

allows Burford abstention where federal review would disrupt a significant

state policy. 472 The Court also noted that neither the presence of complex

state administrative processes, nor the possibility of overturning state
473
policy in a federal court mandated abstention.

Applying these criteria, courts often find Burford abstention to be
proper in cases involving land use issues. These issues are generally local

474
issues of great import, which state courts are best equipped to decide.

Burford abstention, however, often is inappropriate when questions of

467. See Thompson, supra note 431, at 882 (concluding that difference in treatment of
similar cases was result of how courts read plaintiff's complaints).
468. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
469. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans [NOPSI], 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989).
470. Id.
471. See Pomponio v. Fauquier County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 91-1107, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17636, at *10 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 1992) (using NOPSI two-prong test for Burford abstention).
472. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)). NOPSI allows Burford abstention:
(1) when there are 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at
bar'; or (2) where the 'exercise of federal review of a question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect
to a matter of substantial public concern.'
Id. at 814.
473. Id. at 362.
474. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 774 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating
that land use questions are matters of local concern, and that federal courts traditionally do not
interfere with state courts in land use policy); Caleb Stowe Assoc. v. County of Albermarle, 724
F.2d 1079, 1080 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that abstention is proper when claims rest upon
construction of state land use law).
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federal preemption are present, as deciding the case may be beyond the
state's authority.4 75
In Neufeld v. City of Baltimore,476 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered whether Burford abstention was proper
in a case involving both preemption and land use issues. In Neufeld, the
plaintiff, Neufeld, installed a satellite dish in his front yard in order to
improve his television reception. Neufeld had not received approval from
the Baltimore Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals (the Board) before
installing his satellite dish, nor had he complied with the set-back requirements in the zoning code.
When the City of Baltimore informed Neufeld that he was in violation
of the zoning laws, Neufeld appealed to the Board. Neufeld requested a
variance from the zoning laws or a conditional use permit for the satellite
dish. The Board denied Neufeld's request, finding that the dish was
harmful to the general welfare of the community. Neufeld then appealed
the Board's decision to the circuit court for the City of Baltimore. The
circuit court affirmed the Board's findings.
Although Neufeld's placement of the satellite dish violated the zoning
laws, Neufeld did not remove the dish from his front yard. The City
convicted and fined Neufeld for violating the zoning ordinance. Neufeld
appealed the conviction to the circuit court for the City of Baltimore,
claiming that a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation
preempted the zoning laws. The regulation stated that state and local
zoning regulations that differentiate between satellite dishes and other
antennas are preempted unless the regulations have a clear objective and
477
do not impose unreasonable limitations on satellite dish owners.
In addition to the preemption claim, Neufeld also claimed that the
zoning laws violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Neufeld
claimed that the zoning laws restricted his First Amendment right of access
to information, due to the size and placement limitations on satellite

475. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
614 F.2d 206, 212 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that Burford abstention is particularly inappropriate
in cases with preemption claims because preemption claims allege that Congress has determined
that certain matters are of federal concern, and therefore federal courts can not abstain without
implicitly ruling on merits of preemption claims).
476. 964 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1992).
477. Federal Communications Commission Regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (1991). The
regulation states:
State and local zoning or other regulations that differentiate between satellite receiveonly antennas and other types of antenna facilities are preempted unless such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, safety, or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent, reception of
satellite delivered signals by receive-only antennas or to impose costs on the users of
such antennas that are excessive in light ot the purchase and installation cost of the
equipment.
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dishes. Neufeld also claimed that the zoning restrictions violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection Clause, because
the zoning laws discriminated among users of satellite dishes, allowing
schools, churches, and motels to operate larger dishes than other users.
Despite Neufeld's arguments, the circuit court affirmed the conviction.
Neufeld was later convicted of ten additional violations of the same
ordinance and fined. He then removed the satellite dish from his property.
Neufeld filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland against the City of Baltimore and other city officials
and agencies. He reasserted that the FCC regulation preempted Baltimore's
zoning laws, and that the enforcement of the zoning ,laws violated his
constitutional rights. Neufeld requested declaratory and injunctive relief,
as well as damages. The district court abstained under the Burford doctrine
and dismissed the action.
Neufeld appealed to the Fourth Circuit, claiming that Burford abstention was inappropriate due to his preemption and constitutional claims.
In addressing the appeal, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the NOPSI
formulation of the criteria for Burford abstention. In discussing NOPSI,
the court emphasized that because the plaintiff's claim in NOPSI was
primarily a preemption claim, it did not directly involve state law claims
or federal interference in the administration of the state's policy.
The court first analyzed Neufeld's preemption claim and held that the
district court erred in abstaining. The court found that Neufeld's preemption
claim did not present a difficult question of state law involving local concerns.
In addition, federal review would not disrupt state policy. The court reasoned
that because Neufeld had not attacked the substantive basis of the zoning
decision, but had asserted that the FCC regulation had preempted the entire
zoning ordinance, a federal construction of local law was not necessary.
Therefore, neither prong of the test for Burford abstention was satisfied.
47
The court indicated that the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth, 1
Ninth, 47 9 and Eleventh Circuits 4 0 have emphasized that preemption issues
should rarely be the subject of Burford abstention.
The Fourth Circuit next held that Neufeld's constitutional claims did
not meet the criteria for Burford abstention. Neufeld's First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims did not present difficult questions of state law, nor would
the determination of those claims disrupt an important state policy. Further,
the court stated that the threat that a federal court might declare an entire
state system unconstitutional is not a valid basis for Burford abstention.

478. See Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404, 417 (8th
Cir. 1985) (stating that premise of Burford abstention is lacking when federal law or Constitution
makes proceeding or regulation beyond state's authority), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986).
479. See International Bhd., 614 F.2d at 212 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that Burford
abstention is inappropriate if matter is of national, not local, scope).
480. See Bagget v. Department of Professional Regulation, 717 F.2d 521, 524 (lth Cir.
1983) (stating that Burford abstention should not be used to save state regulatory schemes from
preemption scrutiny because goal of Burford abstention is to protect only valid state regulations).
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that it had, in previous cases,
stated that Burford abstention is often appropriate where land use issues are
present. However, the court characterized Neufeld as involving land use issues
in only a peripheral sense, and therefore held that the land use issues involved
in Neufeld did not meet the NOPSI test for abstention. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court.
In Neufeld, the Fourth Circuit applied the NOPSI test for Burford
abstention for the first time in a published opinion. 48' Although the NOPSI
two-prong test does not change the requirements for Burford abstentions,
the NOPSI test is a clearer, more concise statement of the considerations
involved in determining the appropriateness of Burford abstention.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit's Neufeld decision subtly changes the
balancing of the factors involved in a Burford abstention. Previously, the
Fourth Circuit had held that a preemption claim must show a conflict
between state and federal law which is "readily discernable from the pleadings." ' 4 2 Under that test, the challenged state statute must clearly conflict
with the federal statute, so that the federal court would not have to engage
in detailed factfinding before settling the Burford issue. Neufeld, however,
did not mention this requirement. As the FCC regulation at issue in Neufeld
set forth a "reasonableness" standard, 483 which would require factfinding by
the federal court, it appears that a facial conflict is no longer required.
The Neufeld decision also implies that a preemption issue, which indicates
that Burford abstention is improper, outweighs a land use issue, which points
towards abstention. However, the land use issue involved in Neufeld was
not as important or complex as the land use issues involved in previous
Fourth Circuit opinions. 414 Despite this distinction, the court's characterization of the land use issue as "peripheral" to the preemption issue may mean
that the careful pleading of federal issues, such as preemption or constitutional claims, may make any case inappropriate for Burford abstention.
Coakley & Williams Construction, Inc. v. Structural Concrete Equipment,
Inc.
973 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992)
While the United States Courts of Appeal generally agree that the Due
Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States
481. See Millison v. Wilzack, 953 F.2d 638 (TabIe, Text in Westlaw), Unpublished Disposition
(4th Cir. 1992) (using NOPSI test for first time in Fourth Circuit).
482. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Utilities Comm'n, 713 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1983)
(stating that abstention is not per se inappropriate in cases alleging preemption, rather, there
must be direct and facial conflict between statutes).
483. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (stating that local ordinances are preempted unless ordinances
have reasonable objective and do not impose unreasonable limitations or excessive costs on
satellite dish owners).
484. Compare Neufeld, 964 F.2d at 347 (involving prior approval and set-back requirements
for individual satellite dish) with Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 774 F.2d 77, 79
(1985) (concerning regulation of solid waste landfill) and Caleb Stowe Assocs. v. County of
Albermarle, 724 F.2d 1079, 1080 (1984) (involving acceptability of sewage facilities for subdivision).
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Constitution4 5 do not confer upon litigants a right to oral argument on a
motion, 4s6 the circuits are divided on the question of whether it is proper
for a federal district court to grant a motion for summary judgment without
7
first affording the nonmoving party an opportunity for an oral hearing.4
The United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
held that a court must give the adverse party the opportunity for such a
hearing.48
Conversely, the United States Courts of Appeal for the First, Third,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that a
court may dispense with oral argument on motions for summary judgment
in appropriate circumstances.4 9 Some of the circuits holding that an opportunity for an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment is not
absolutely essential have expressed the view that courts should nonetheless
hear oral arguments in most cases. 490 Other circuits have left the matter
41
entirely within the discretion of the trial court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit resolved a
similar question in the 1964 case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
485. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
486. See Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that constitutional
due process does not require court to hear oral argument before ruling on motion); Atkinson v.
Bass, 579 F.2d 865, 866-67 (4th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978); Spark v. Catholic
Univ., 510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (same); Morrow v. Topping, 437"F.2d 1155, 1155
(9th Cir. 1971) (same); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 467 (4th
Cir.) (same), cert denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir.
1963) (same), cert denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964).
487. See Spark, 510 F.2d at 1280 (recognizing division of authority in federal circuit courts
on question of whether district courts may grant summary judgment motions without giving
adverse party opportunity for oral hearing).
488. See Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 373 F.2d 493, 496-98 (5th
Cir.) (holding that it is abuse of discretion for district court to grant summary judgment motion
without oral hearing), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 851 (1967); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456,
461-62 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that because summary judgment motion disposes of action on
merits with prejudice, district court may not deny request for oral hearing of party opposing
motion unless it denies motion); cf. Gary v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting
that generally, district court has discretion not to hear oral testimony on motions); Morrow v.
Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
489. See CIA. Petrolera Caribe,* Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 411 (lst Cir.
1985) (holding that trial court did not err in denying request for oral argument before rendering
summary judgment because briefs sufficiently set out legal arguments); Spark v. Catholic Univ.,
510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that court may dispense with oral argument on
motion for summary judgment in appropriate circumstances); Parish v. Howard, 459 F.2d 616,
620 (8th Cir. 1972) (same); Season-All Indus. Inc. v. Turkiye Sise Ve Cam Fabrikalari, 425 F.2d
34, 39 (3d Cir. 1970) (same); Hazen v. S. Hills Nat'l Bank, 414 F.2d 778, 780 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that when parties filed comprehensive briefs, court did not err in denying hearing before
ruling on motion for summary judgment); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1963)
(same), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908 (1964).
490. See, e.g., Season-All, 425 F.2d at 39 (expressing view that courts should not deny
hearing on motion for summary judgment except in very narrow circumstances because granting
motion disposes of claim or defense with finality).
491. See, e.g., CIA. Petrolera,754 F.2d at 411 (holding that trial court has "wide latitude"
in deciding whether to hear oral argument before rendering summary judgment).
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v. Lawrenson492 in which it decided that it is not improper for a district
court to rule on a motion for a new trial without granting the nonmoving
party the opportunity to make an oral argument against it.4 93 In Coakley &
Williams Construction, Inc. v. Structural Concrete Equipment, Inc.,'4 the
Fourth Circuit considered, for the first time, whether a trial court errs when
it grants a motion for summary judgment without first affording the parties
an opportunity for an oral hearing on the motion.
Coakley & Williams involved a release provision in a settlement agreement that terminated an- earlier suit between the same parties. Interpreting
the settlement agreement as barring the claims asserted in the later case, the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary
judgment to the defendant, Structural Concrete Equipment (SCE) without
first allowing the plaintiff, Coakley & Williams (C&W) to present its case
orally against the motion. The issue in Coakley & Williams was whether it
is proper for a district court to deny a party opposing a motion for summary
judgment an opportunity for an oral hearing before granting the motion.
In Coakley & Williams, C&W was the general contractor on a project
to construct a Days Inn. SCE contracted to construct the cast-in-place
structural concrete work for the project but later recommended that C&W
subcontract that work to Superior Contractors (Superior), an entity whose
president was also the president of SCE. C&W hired Superior on SCE's
recommendation, but later dismissed Superior from the job. In 1988, SCE
brought suit against C&W for conversion of certain concrete forms that
Superior had leased from SCE, and C&W counterclaimed for trespass. In a
1989 offer of settlement, C&W proposed that the parties settle all disputes
between them and that they reserve any claims which either of them might
have against Superior. The litigation ended eleven days later when the parties
executed a settlement agreement that included a provision releasing their
claims against each other with regard to matters arising out of the pleadings
in the then-current litigation. The agreement further stated that the settlement
was intended to prevent further litigation.
In 1991, C&W sued SCE for fraudulent and negligent inducement,
alleging that SCE's misrepresentations induced C&W to award the subcontract to Superior. Pursuant to a local Maryland rule, the district court
granted SCE's motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing. The
court based its decision to grant summary judgment on its finding that in
entering into the settlement agreement, the parties intended to settle all their
claims against each other arising out of the Days Inn construction project,
irrespective of whether they were pleaded in the presettlement litigation.
Despite the wording of the release provision (in terms of causes of action
arising out of the pleadings in the litigation which the parties were resolving),

492. 334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964).
493. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 466-67 (4th Cir.), cert
denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964).
494. 973 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992).
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the district court held that the settlement agreement evidenced the parties'
intent to release all claims associated with the project, because it contained
two separate statements of intent to avoid further litigation.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit had to determine whether the district
court erred in granting SCE's motion for summary judgment without holding
a hearing. Having never previously ruled on the specific question raised in
49s
Coakley & Williams, the Fourth Circuit relied on its decision in Lawrenson.
The Fourth Circuit noted the division among the circuits that have passed
upon the question of whether it is proper for a district court to grant a
motion for summary judgment absent an opportunity for an oral hearing.

Looking to precedent for guidance, the court compared the motion for
summary judgment in Coakley & Williams to the motion for new trial in
Lawrenson and held that an abuse of discretion standard governs a district
court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment without a hearing.
4
In addition to Lawrenson, Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9
which provided the basis for the local Maryland rule, guided the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Coakley & Williams. According to the Fourth Circuit,
Rule 78 makes it clear that the question of whether to hold oral hearings
on motions is a matter within the discretion of the district court. 497 Because
the language of both Rule 78 and Lawrenson is broad, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the abuse of discretion standard applies to all motions
granted without an opportunity for an oral hearing, including motions for
summary judgment. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Though due process clearly does not require courts to give a litigant
who is opposing a motion for summary judgment the opportunity for an
oral hearing before granting the motion, 49 a minority of United States
Courts of Appeal have held that, at times, it is proper for a district court
to grant a motion for summary judgment without first affording the adverse
party an opportunity for oral argument on the matter. The minority position
emphasizes that the weighty nature of a motion for summary judgment
should entitle the adverse party to an opportunity to argue the motion

495. 334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964).
496. FED. R. Civ. P. 78.
497. FED. R. Crv. P. 78. Rule 78 reads in pertinent part:
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the
submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written
statements of reasons in support and opposition.
Id.
498. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; See Wilkins v. Rogers, 581
F.2d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that constitutional due process does not require court to
hear oral argument before ruling on motion); Atkinson v. Bass, 579 F.2d 865, 866-67 (4th Cir.)
(same), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978); Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (same); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1155 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 379 U.S.
869 (1964); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 375 U.S. 985
(1964).

